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Abstract 
Public managers engage in networking relationships with a wide variety of external 
actors and organizations from which they can draw different types of support to the core 
agency. They thus face a wide array of possible actions and strategic choices with regard to 
their potential networking behaviour. Most empirical studies on managerial networking, 
however, merely expose different levels of networking activity, as if it were a uni-dimensional 
concept. This inadequacy potentially obscures information on the actual patterns to be found 
in networking behaviour itself. To make up for this theoretical-empirical incongruence, this 
paper accordingly uses Mokken-Scaling to expose different dimensions of managerial 
networking. By demonstrating how public managers differentiate between different external 
actors and organizations, it thus facilitates the environmental complexity in which public 
management takes place. The research context for this analysis is found in the recent shift 
from central to local authority marked by the Social Support Act (SSA/WMO). 
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Introduction  
Although government programs and policies have always involved complex clusters 
of individuals, groups, and organizations, such patterns of networking have become even 
more prevalent in recent decades (Rainey, 2003: 148). The nature of public service delivery 
has changed through developments of (1) increased privatization and contracting out, (2) a 
greater involvement of the non-profit sector, and (3) complex and ‘wicked’ problems that 
exceed the scope and capacity of single organizations (Rittel & Weber 1973; O’Toole 1997). 
Moreover, the current financial-economic crisis forces governments worldwide to cut down 
expenses and implement large-scale reforms in almost all domains of the public sector. These 
environmental changes compel (semi-) public organizations to adapt their strategies, goals, 
and primary processes. A much reported response is the emergence of some form of inter-
organizational collaboration or cooperation (Milward & Provan 2000; Meier & O’Toole 2003; 
Agranoff & McGuire 2001). As the operation of government and public management has then 
become more differentiated, pluralistic, and decentralized, the networking concept has gained 
prominence in public administration research, as to take it ‘out of the narrow tunnel of 
formally designed structures and mandated organizations’ (Toonen, 1998: 250).  
Public managers that operate in the complexity of the above described settings, engage 
in networking relationships with a wide variety of external actors and organizations from 
which they can draw different types of support to the core agency (Bozeman 1987; Heymann 
1987; Moore 1995; Rainey & Steinbauer 1999; Moynihan & Pandey 2005). They thus face a 
wide array of possible actions and strategic choices with regard to their potential networking 
behaviour. Oddly enough, however, empirical studies on public sector networking rarely 
support this theoretical contention. For instance, Torenvlied et al. (2013: 252) observe how 
current empirical evidence of studies on managerial networking merely expose different levels 
of networking activity, as if it were a uni-dimensional concept (e.g. Meier & O’Toole 1999). 
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Despite the - albeit important - range of explanation this general dimension of managerial 
networking has provided in terms of organizational performance
1
, its conceptualization does 
not do justice to the multiplicity of activities and functions that are involved in the public 
management of an increasingly complex environment. A great deal of information on the 
patterns to be found in networking behaviour is then potentially obscured. To make up for this 
inadequacy, this paper accordingly attempts to expose different dimensions of managerial 
networking, as to facilitate the environmental complexity in which it takes place.  
At the theoretical level, it does so by combining elements of the three dominant 
perspectives in public administration research on networking in the public sector. Although 
much of the analysis in this paper relies heavily on the managerial networking logic specified 
by Meier and O’Toole (1999), we should acknowledge that the inter-organizational and 
collaborative networking perspectives also carry important insights into the workings of 
public sector networks in general. Rather than cutting them off, it then seems a more fruitful 
approach to grant them a complementary role in theoretically framing the individual actions 
of public managers. This (1) gives us a better understanding of coordination and network 
structure as important mediators for effective public service delivery (e.g.  Milward & Provan 
1995; Provan & Kenis 2007), and (2) focuses our attention on processes of collaboration and 
the individual strategies that network member employ to facilitate and operate in multi-
organizational arrangements (e.g. Agranoff 2006). These insights then provide the input for a 
conceptualization of managerial networking that is more consistent with what public 
managers actually do, i.e. a conceptualization that does not limit our understanding of their 
behaviour to one general dimension of managerial networking activity. 
                                                          
1
 See Sartori (1970: 1053) for the “ladder of abstraction” and the balancing act of finding concepts that provide 
both an acceptable range of explanation and an adequate accuracy of description. For the managerial networking 
concept the balance has seemingly shifted to the detriment of the latter.  
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At the methodological level, this paper follows up on a research agenda set by 
Torenvlied et al. (2013), in which a case is made for the potential of cumulative scaling for 
the analysis of managerial networking. In that sense, it is partly a replication of their analysis 
performed on the networking behaviour of Texas School Districts superintendents, in which 
Mokken Scaling was used to disaggregate managerial networking into multiple scales of 
managerial networking activity (ibid.: 252). However, the same analysis is now carried out in 
a vastly different context – the local SSA policy in the Netherlands - and thus subjects the 
initial argument to a challenging test of external validity. Moreover, rather than looking for 
different general dimensions, this paper expects the patterns of managerial networking 
behaviour to depend heavily on the specificities of the studied policy and its goals. Here, we 
slightly divert from Torenvlied et al.’s (2013) theoretical ambition, as the analysis of 
networking behaviour presented below is somewhat more contextualized
2
 to the institutional 
setting in which it takes place. By demonstrating how these different dimensions of 
managerial networking can then be exposed and analyzed, this paper helps to fill an apparent 
gap in the literature on networking and performance.  
     This paper will proceed as follows. Firstly, in order to place ourselves in a wider 
body of literature, an overview is given of studies on networking in the public sector. An 
adequate understanding of these more general issues and conceptualizations subsequently 
allows us to situate the present study in a more particular perspective; i.e. that of managerial 
networking. This helps us straighten out relevant concepts of networking and public 
management, laying down the theoretical foundation to make our argument with regard to the 
multiple dimensions of (managerial) networking. Armed with these theoretical contentions, 
                                                          
2 In “facilitating environmental complexity”, the theoretical ambition of providing context-independent, first-
order explanations in the analysis of networking behavior seems misguided. Instead, it seems a more fruitful 
approach to have our analysis accommodate for the open-ended, contingent relation between contexts and 
actions and interpretations that is involved in any form of human activity (see Flyvbjerg, 2001: chapter 3 & 4). 
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we will then step down to the more concrete level and present a research context that allows 
empirical testing. This context is found in the implementation of the SSA-policy in Dutch 
municipalities. After operationalizing the identified theoretical concepts, the analytical section 
of the paper uses the Mokken-scaling technique to expose different dimensions in managerial 
networking. Lastly, a concluding section will serve to frame a discussion, put the findings of 
the present study into perspective, and set directions for future research.   
Literature Review  
Networks and Public Management 
When using the term networks, the literature generally refers to ‘multi-organizational 
arrangements for solving problems that cannot be achieved, or achieved easily, by single 
organizations’ (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001: 296). In a public management context, these 
networks are led by government representatives. For the public and non-profit sectors in 
particular, addressing complex issues that demands multilateral coordination requires more 
than merely achieving the goals of individual organizations (O’Toole 1997). Therefore, 
collective action and the governance of these activities are needed (Provan & Kenis, 2008: 
232). In the increasingly complex and complicated environment of public service delivery 
(see introduction), networks are often employed as the intentionally chosen and designed 
agents of public management (Lynn, Jr. 2006: 152). Network analysis is accordingly 
characterized by “the examination of the multiple interactions that comprise full networks, 
including discussion of how public policy is implemented through networks of cooperating 
service providers” (Milward & Provan, 2001: 414). 
A distinctive characteristic of these public service delivery networks is that they are 
primarily non-hierarchical; i.e. participants often have substantial operating autonomy 
(Provan et al. 2007: 483). In essence, networks are thus structures of interdependence in 
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which none of the units is the formal subordinate of the others in some larger hierarchical 
arrangement (O’Toole & Meier, 2011: 55). Still, the organizations within the network 
influence each other through dyadic interactions, or are connected with each other through a 
sub-network of multiple relations. To understand networking behaviour, the unit of analysis is 
then not only the actors themselves, but also the connections between them. These 
connections - or ties between the nodes – come in many different shapes and sizes. They can 
both be formal or informal and facilitate a wide variety of exchanges, ranging from 
information, materials, and financial resources to services, and social support (ibid.).  
Different types of relations between organizations can thus be identified and what is 
substantively being exchanged between organizations can be differentiated according to (1) 
strategic content and (2) the degree of personal interaction that is involved (Schalk, 2013: 
856-857). For instance, relations for mobilizing financial resources and the resulting 
monitoring relations with the organization providing these financial means (Kickert et al. 
1997), will require some (personal) managerial interaction for its initiation; once in place 
however, these types of relations are not expected to strongly convey strategic information 
(ibid: 857). On the other hand, the intensive coordination process of client referrals - needed 
to acquire information of clients to whom the services are provided (see Milward & Provan 
1995) - may require a higher degree of strategic information exchange and personal contact 
between network members as to facilitate the continuous exchange (Schalk, 2013: 857). 
Similarly, discussing strategic possibilities for cooperation between organizations requires 
managerial interaction (Meier & O’Toole 2003), marked by a high degree of personal 
involvement between organizational members and strategic information exchange (Schalk, 
2013: 858). In that sense, the actual content of existing relations between organizations can 
differ widely, seemingly pointing to multidimensionality in public service delivery networks 
(cf. Hjern & Porter 1981).  
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From Resource-Dependence to Managing Interdependencies 
In line with the definition of networks provided above, network interactions allow 
organizations to achieve goals that they could not have achieved by themselves (Agranoff & 
McGuire, 2001: 296). From this follows the core assumption of public management networks; 
namely that the establishment of these networking relations allow public sector organizations 
to successfully deal with the complexities of their interdependencies (Provan & Milward 
1995; Klijn & Koppenjan 1997; Torenvlied et al. 2013). In that sense, the relationship 
between networking and effective public service delivery is generally perceived as a positive 
one. For managers who have to deal with the complexity of the environment in which their 
organizations operate, actively developing a wide variety of network relations could then 
provide an outcome. A successful application of this strategy would accordingly lead to an 
enhanced performance of the organization itself (Kickert et al. 1997; Rethemeyer et al. 2008; 
Akkerman & Torenvlied 2011a).  
The main theoretical foundation for this hypothesis can be traced back to the work of 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978). They summarize the perks of maintaining network relations in 
three main assertions (ibid: 145-146): (1) network relations make sure that information that 
could be crucial to the activities of the own organization is acquired and exchanged in an 
optimal fashion; (2) network relations help in developing commitment of stakeholders to the 
activities of the own organizations; and (3) the interaction between organizations can stabilize 
the environment and hence reduce uncertainty.  
This resource-dependence perspective is based on the premise that public 
organizations - in their day-to-day activities and operations - are highly dependent on other 
organizations and actors. In practice, this (inter-)dependency manifests itself in several forms; 
first and foremost, in order to operate smoothly, public organizations require information and 
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resources of the environment in which they operate. In this fashion, they can – for example - 
learn about the needs of their clients and anticipate to future trends in their demands. 
Moreover, these network relations keep public organizations informed about new 
technologies and innovations and can grant them proper access to the funding institutions that 
are crucial to their survival.  
 In addition, public sector organizations require the trusted cooperation of other 
organizations in order to facilitate smooth interactions and foster learning and innovation 
(Pfeffer & Salancik 1978; Aldrich 2008; Powell et al. 1996; Zaheer et al. 1998). This inter-
organizational trust can be defined as ‘the willingness to accept vulnerability based on 
positive expectations about another’s intentions and behaviours’ (McEvely et al. 2003: 92). 
Whenever this trust is present, organizations will expect the counterpart to behave in a 
predictable, reliable, and fair manner, in particular when the opportunity for opportunism is 
present (Bachmann & Zaheer, 2008: 535-536). Trust thus plays an important role of limiting 
opportunistic behaviour in inter-organizational relationships (Bachmann & Zaheer, 2008: 
545). In that sense, it is a more efficient and cheaper governance mechanism than, say, a 
hierarchy.  
Three Approaches in Public Administration 
Based on the theoretical foundation laid down above, three perspectives have sprung 
up in public administration research with regard to the linkage between inter-organizational 
networking and public performance. Firstly, the inter-organizational network-approach is 
concerned with the structure and governance of “whole” networks (Provan & Milward 2001). 
The core hypothesis here is that public performance - usually measured at the community 
level - is related to the structure of the network (Provan & Milward 1995; Provan et al. 2007). 
When reasoning from this perspective, coordination is held to be the main explanatory 
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mechanism of performance. As Milward and Provan (1995: 24) have shown in their study of 
community mental health systems, coordination can ensure close cooperation between 
otherwise atomic organizations with conflicting goals. Moreover, centrally coordinated inter-
organizational networks are held to perform better than either dense or sparse ones 
(Akkerman et al. 2012).  
A second approach, the managerial networking perspective, focuses on the network 
activity of individual managers with various external actors and organizations - e.g. suppliers, 
clients, political institutions, regulatory agencies etc. (Torenvlied et al. 2013). This managerial 
networking can act as a moderator between the organization’s day-to-day activities and its 
turbulent environment. The vital resources needed for an organization to perform – i.e. 
information, materials, expertise, money – will be transferred through relations with these 
external organizations. For instance, Meier and O’Toole (1999) find how different 
characteristics of networking activity positively affect the performance of high schools in the 
Texas school district. The two main explanatory mechanisms in this perspective are that 
active networking enables organizations to (1) exploit their environment, in terms of resources 
and information, and (2) buffer environmental shocks (i.e. changes in political, economic and 
technical demands) (ibid.). 
Thirdly, the collaborative network perspective is not so much focused on outcome 
variables, but more on the process of collaboration. When one talks about network 
management in this capacity, one refers to the strategies individual network members employ 
to facilitate and operate in multi-organizational arrangements (Agranoff, 2006: 56). In this 
fashion, organizations can set up the rules, routines, norms and values that govern their 
interactions and mutual dependencies. This affects the substantive content and quality of 
relations of the network – delineated by some boundary rule specification – and thus also the 
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performance of the network as a whole (Klijn & Koppenjan 2000; Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof 
2008). This ‘performance’ is usually measured as perceived by its participants.  
Theory, Concepts, and Hypotheses  
Of the three approaches prevalent in public administration research (managerial, inter-
organizational, collaborative), this paper mainly focuses on the managerial networking 
perspective. When talking about networking in this capacity, we refer to the actions of the 
individual manager in the networked environment of his or her public agency (O’Toole & 
Meier, 2011: 59). The unit of analysis is thus the so-called ‘ego-network’ of the public 
manager and the main focus is on the individual actions he/she undertakes. However, as to 
provide a more comprehensive theoretical framing of this managerial networking behaviour, 
this section also draws on insights from the inter-organizational and collaborative networking 
perspectives. In a complementary role, these perspectives can improve our understanding of 
the environmental complexity in which the analyzed networking behaviour takes place, 
allowing for a more accurate conceptualization. 
External Management and Stakeholders 
  In the managerial networking perspective, networking activity is usually 
conceptualized by the contact-frequencies that the high-ranking managers maintain with 
external actors and organizations. The more active public managers are in this regard, the 
better their organizations can be expected to perform (Meier & O’Toole 2003; Agranoff & 
McGuire 2001; Rethemeyer et al. 2008; Akkerman & Torenvlied 2011a). Two causal 
mechanisms lie at the basis of this positive relationship: (1) active networking allows 
organizations to exploit their environment, in terms of resources and information; and (2) it 
enables organizations to buffer environmental shocks, such as changes in political, economic, 
or technical demands (Meier & O’Toole 1999). 
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 The external actors and organizations with which the core agency engages in 
networking relationships are of a wide variety. They range from suppliers, stakeholders, and 
clients, to alliance partners, regulatory agencies, and political institutions (Torenvlied et al. 
2013: 252). These environmental factors can have a significant influence on the core agency’s 
performance
3
. Recent studies report on how organizations can actively draw different types 
and sources of support in their environment (Bozeman 1987; Torenvlied et al. 2013). 
Moreover, some of these sources may in fact be beyond the control of public managers 
themselves, i.e. they do not ´control all levers´ (Moynihan & Pandey, 2005: 433). In that 
sense, a focus on the exogenous forces shaping the behaviour and performance of public 
agencies and their managers seems justified. Still, some important questions prevail, 
particularly with regard to the question of multiple dimensions in managerial networking.  
Different Types of Actors = Different Types of Support 
An approach in which a factor analysis provides us with the managerial networking 
dimension implies that managers who are inactive (i.e. a low score on the factor) tend to 
network infrequently with few external organizations, while managers who are active (i.e. a 
high score on the factor) tend to network frequently with many organizations (Torenvlied et 
al. 2013: 253). However, different kinds of external actors and organizations provide different 
types of support to the core agency (Torenvlied et al. 2013). We can then see how public 
managers face a wide array of possible actions and strategic choices with regard to their 
networking behaviour. In that sense, (managerial) networking activity seems more complex 
and subtle than a mere counting of relationships between organizations implies (McGuire 
2002). After all, this conceptualization tells us fairly little about what actually happens 
                                                          
3
 The idea that this environment can play an important role for the core organization is a relatively old one. 
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) already developed hypotheses on how organizations would be best suited to adapt 
to the demands of their immediate environment and Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) were concerned with tapping 
into environmental resources essential for organizational survival. 
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between the networking nodes, i.e. the ties connecting them remain somewhat of a black box. 
Moreover, each external tie the organization maintains with other network members is held to 
be of similar strength, importance, and substance. This seems a rather distorted image of 
reality, given the environmental complexity in which public managers and their organizations 
operate.   
The Theoretical Implications of One General Dimension 
Although maintaining frequent contact with all relevant environmental actors is very 
likely to positively affect the performance of the agency itself (Moynihan & Pandey 2005; 
Schalk et al. 2010; Akkerman & Torenvlied 2011a), the effect and importance of each of 
these actor types and the importance of their support should not be treated in a similar fashion. 
Annulling variation in the behaviour of network managers, by analyzing it through one 
general dimension of managerial networking activity, obscures a great deal of information on 
the actual behaviour of network managers (Torenvlied et al. 2013: 252). Upholding this single 
common factor of managerial networking - particularly prevalent in the work of Meier and 
O’Toole (1999) – has several severe theoretical implications that make it an unfeasible 
approach for the analysis of managerial networking behaviour. 
Firstly, the “Meier and O’Toole-approach” carries the assumption that network 
managers do not discriminate between different types of environmental actors (Akkerman & 
Torenvlied, 2011b). This seems unrealistic when considering the many types of organizations 
with which public managers are surrounded, inevitably leading to different patterns of 
networking in which managers establish network relations more frequently with some pairs of 
external actors and more infrequently with others (Torenvlied et al. 2013: 253). Secondly, 
those managers observed to be most active in terms of managerial networking - as 
operationalized by one common dimension - are also expected to have the most diverse 
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networks. However, this can lead to serious measurement error, as it may in fact be the 
separate concept of network diversity itself that is responsible for the increased performance, 
rather than the network frequency that is held to represent it. Thirdly, considerations of time-
management, physical proximity, and functional necessity, has us more interested in the 
specific types of actors with which network managers are involved. After all, not every one of 
these external actors should be expected to be equally beneficial or have equal importance to 
the core agency. A central question is then why network managers are more willing to invest 
in one type of relation over another? What goals does the public manager have and how does 
this affect his choice for certain types of environmental actors? Specific environmental actors 
will serve specific goals and an adequate analysis of networking behaviour should take this 
consideration into account.  
Managerial Networking as Goal-Oriented Behaviour 
 In light of the above made arguments, we should expect public managers to behave in 
a goal-oriented fashion. After all, despite both science’s and society’s optimism about the 
positive effects that public service delivery through networks can bring about, we should also 
note that networking can in fact be a costly endeavour. In that sense, managers are best 
advised to be selective in their investments in relationships with external actors (Heymann 
1987; Moore 2000). They have to decide on what external actors and organizations serve the 
goals and interests of the core agency best. For instance, public managers under strict 
budgetary supervision, prioritize relationships with organizations that yield financial support. 
Then again, if the core organization receives negative feedback from clients, the public 
manager is more likely to invest in network relationships with client interest groups 
(Torenvlied et al. 2013). The main premise here is that public managers thus face a choice of 
how much to invest in relationships with specific external actors and organizations. Certain 
cost-benefit mechanisms seem to underlie their behaviour. 
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Managerial Networking as a Costly Endeavour  
In terms of costs, Agranoff (2007) notes how actively managing the environment by 
engaging in a wide variety of network relations also means that the manager has less time for 
the internal management of the own organization. These opportunity costs of external 
management should be taken seriously as they can have serious consequences for the 
organization’s functioning. Moreover, if the network collaboration is to become a success, the 
organizations participating will have to adjust their behaviour to each other. Inevitable 
coordination costs are bound up in this process - i.e. investments, effort, obtaining 
information, etc. Being coordinated - with all the monitoring, adjustments, and constraints this 
entails –means an inevitable loss of autonomy. The goals, strategies, and preferences of each 
organization will have to be altered and each individual actor will not be eager for too many 
concessions in this regard.  
 The above made considerations complicate matters significantly. In a sense, the shared 
interest of effective public service delivery and the high levels of interdependency between 
the network organizations for reaching this common goal
4
 may not be enough to generate 
successful implementation (O’Toole, 2012: 298-299). Joint impediments still remain as 
opposing organizational interests will inevitably exist/prevail in the policy-network. Despite 
overlaps in interest and priorities, there will also be discrepancies due to different goals and 
perspectives on policy matters (O’Toole, 2012: 299). Moreover, the complicated policy 
challenges with which the organizations are faced, requires consideration by different kinds of 
units reflecting distinct and partially competing goals. Expecting a common interest in these 
instances is unrealistic.  
 
                                                          
4
 Being bound up in a “shared fate”, as Laumann & Knoke (1987) name it.  
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Considering the Benefits 
The benefits of managerial networking should then also be noted. When considering 
the “publicness” of the agency environment, we can see how it is inevitably shaped by a 
multitude of actors (Bozeman 1987). Besides political and bureaucratic actors, the public, 
agency clients, and other stakeholders will also have a substantial influence (Heymann 1987, 
Moore 1995, Rainey & Steinbauer 1999; Lynn, Jr. 2006). Including these actors in the policy-
making process will only enhance the “publicness” of policy outcomes; i.e. generate a more 
legitimate means of public service delivery. Complementing this main consideration, four 
distinct benefits surface when including various actors in the process of public service 
delivery (Edelenbos & Klijn 2006). 
Firstly, by involving influential actors early on in the decision-making process, the 
government can prevent that these actors use their veto power to block or oppose decision-
making later on. After all, they are expected to be more supportive of a policy decision to 
which they contributed themselves. Secondly, involving numerous actors in the decision-
making procedures, allows for the inclusion of different aspects of the problem in the 
formulation of a solution. This leads to a more complete and flexible policy process and 
avoids a premature fixation on one-dimensional solutions dominated by a single perception or 
rationality (ibid.). Thirdly, incorporating different perspectives and ideas tells a more 
complete story and brings in different types of skills, information, experience, and knowledge. 
This should enhance the overall quality of the final policy. Lastly, interactive decision-making 
involves citizens in the decision-making process, accordingly increasing identification with 
governmental policy products and closing the gap between state and society. In that sense, 
involving more actors gives the decision-making process a more open character. This can 
enhance democratic legitimacy and is in accordance with the idea of representative 
democracy (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2006: 420-421).   
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Differentiating Dimensions 
 Summarizing, the environmental complexity in which public managers operate, had us 
reconsider the adequate conceptualization of their managerial networking behaviour. In order 
to accommodate for the different types of actors and organizations that provide different types 
of support to the core agency, we should not limit our understanding of managerial 
networking to one general dimension. Instead, public managers operate in a goal-oriented 
fashion and face a choice of how much to invest in relationships with specific external actors 
and organizations. These considerations provide a firm belief in the existence of different 
dimensions in managerial networking. To enable us to subject our theoretical contentions to 
empirical testing, we set up the following hypothesis:  
“Managerial networking can be differentiated along different dimensions, each related to a 
specific type of support to the agency that can be provided by external actors and 
organizations.”5 
Research Context, Data, and Study Design 
Case Selection: SSA/WMO 
 Recent decades have seen some major decentralization operations in the Netherlands 
(Gilsing 2007; Veldheer 2009). One that stands out in particular, is the shift from central to 
local authority marked by the Social Support Act
6
 (SSA/WMO) (Schalk, 2011: 7). With the 
SSA, the Dutch central government places the responsibility with local governments to 
stimulate the (social) participation of its citizens (TK 2003-2004). Besides a realignment of 
legislation, however, the SSA is also an emphatic attempt to realize social and administrative 
innovation (Timmermans et al, 2010: 23-33). In essence, the SSA is designed to ensure that 
                                                          
5
 See also Torenvlied et al. (2013: 255) 
6
 In Dutch: Wet Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning (WMO) 
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citizens can remain self-sufficient for as long as possible and are enabled to participate in 
society (Van der Veer, 2011: 266). 
  Two aspects of the SSA in particular, make it an interesting research context for the 
present paper’s purposes (Van der Veer et al. 2011). Firstly, the SSA is a “framework law”, 
i.e. although central government outlines the broader goals and intended (social) effects of the 
policies in the SSA-setup, municipalities are given an extensive degree of autonomy and 
discretion in formulating their own variant of the local policy to be implemented and the 
choice of instruments by which the central goals are to be attained. Thus, municipalities are 
free to develop their own policy within the bounds of the set framework (see Koppenjan et al. 
2009). Secondly, the vertical lines of accountability are absent in the new institutional setup 
through which the SSA-policy is implemented. In other words, local society is expected to 
keep checks on the policy in a horizontal fashion. These two elements combined, ensure that 
the SSA distinguishes itself from other decentralizations projects, as municipalities are left 
with far more discretion and autonomy with regard to the formulation and execution of local 
policy. This is of interest to this study as variation in network structures and strategies can 
then be expected.  
 But what exactly is the role of stakeholders in the specific context of the SSA? The 
wide range of services provided to SSA clients requires the coordination and support of many 
different types of actors. This requirement is reflected by the SSA’s strong recommendation 
to involve multiple actors in all stages of policy making (Schalk, 2011: 8). Consistent with the 
managerial networking logic specified above, this recommendation carries the underlying 
assumption that an intensive degree of stakeholder involvement will eventually increase 
overall policy performance (ibid.). By developing and maintaining relation with different 
actors and organizations, the local governments are envisioned a role of policy broker or ‘lead 
organization’ (cf. Provan & Kenis 2008).   
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The way this interactive process of stakeholder involvement is then organized in local 
SSA-policy making, is through official long-term forums of negotiations and roundtables 
(Schalk, 2011: 8). Stakeholders thus have no actual political decision-making power, but are 
represented in participatory forums in which they can voice their concerns and interests. A 
public manager of the municipality has the responsibility and discretion to organize this 
process of inter-organizational service delivery. It is the behaviour of this individual in 
particular to which we devote our attention when analyzing the managerial networking done 
in the SSA context. 
Professional and Client Stakeholder Involvement 
 At the theoretical level, two functional types of actors can be distinguished in SSA-
policymaking: professional stakeholder organizations and client interest organizations (De 
Klerk et al. 2010; Schalk 2011: 3). Professional stakeholder organizations are the main 
service-providers to the client-population. Operating under different levels of government, 
most of these partner organizations have either a non-profit or semi-public legal status, 
although some private organizations are also included in the SSA-setup (e.g. transport 
companies). To serve the broad variety of goals specified by the SSA, these widely differing 
organizations each have their particular specializations and can thus provide the local 
government with different kinds of expertise. Moreover, as actual service providers¸ 
professional organizations often possess the extensive (financial and other) resources that 
local governments need for successful policy implementation. Performance feedback on their 
respective clienteles and other critical information on service delivery methods and best 
practices should also be considered in this regard.  
Client interest organizations represent the interests of different client groups, such as 
the elderly or disabled. Their main focus lies with influencing policy-outcomes, as to embody 
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the concerns of their clients. For local governments, these organizations possess critical 
information on the wide variety of clients the SSA-policy is expected to serve. Moreover, the 
success of service delivery will be contingent on the support of these different client-groups. 
Including them in the policy-making process is an important means of securing this 
requirement (cf. Bozeman 1987; Edelenbos & Klijn 2006). Although the involvement of 
professional and clients interest groups are largely separate processes, both types of 
organizations are involved in the policy implementation and formulation phases. The degree 
to which these different actors are involved in the policy-process can be held to represent their 
perceived importance for a successful policy implementation (Schalk, 2011: 11).   
A Wide Variety of Policy Goals 
 With the SSA, Dutch government intends to encourage social participation and active 
involvement of all its citizens, particularly those dubbed as the more ‘vulnerable’ groups in 
society (De Klerk et al. 2010). This latter category of individuals includes - amongst others - 
the elderly, people with a physical or mental impediment, problem youth, the homeless, and 
addicts. To serve all these different categories of clients, the SSA is thus concerned with 
widely differing policy goals, evinced by the nine centrally formulated ‘performance targets’ 
set up to guide and evaluate local implementation (see appendix A). These targets range from 
“supporting informal care and voluntary work” (target 4) to “providing community shelter” 
(target 8), and from “facilitating the independent functioning of those with physical or mental 
impediments” (target 5 & 6) to “activating social cohesion and livability” in neighborhoods 
(target 1) (TK 2004-2005). To accommodate all interests related to these different aspects of 
the comprehensive SSA-policy, local governments are thus expected to involve a wide variety 
of different stakeholders.    
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Data: SCP Process-Scan  
 The dataset used for testing the specified hypothesis was obtained from the 
Netherlands Institute of Social Research (SCP), a government agency that conducts research 
into the social aspects of all areas of government policy (source: SCP website). The Process 
Scan (PS) is a dataset containing information on the full population of Dutch local 
governments (N = 443). It provides the results of a questionnaire answered by the public 
manager assigned as the key coordinator of the local SSA policy-making process. It was sent 
in the first quarter of 2008 and retrospectively addresses the policy-making process of 2007. 
The response rate was 83 %, leaving us with a sample of 383 municipalities.  
Operationalizing and Measuring Stakeholder Involvement 
 The Process Scan carries information on the SSA-coordinator’s networking behavior. 
In the data, a distinction is made between the involvement of professional stakeholder 
organizations and that of client interest organizations. As these are largely separate process, in 
the sense that local government typically establish separate platforms in which either client 
interest organizations or professional organizations participate, this distinction seems 
justified.  
To assess the degree of stakeholder involvement, the public managers were asked to 
indicate which of the 20 different functional types of professional organizations, and 11 
different functional types of client interest organizations were involved in the local SSA 
policy making process. The list of organizations was constructed carefully through roundtable 
sessions with representatives from stakeholder organizations in the field across the 
Netherlands (De Klerk et al. 2010; Schalk, 2011: 10). Of these lists, public managers could 
accordingly indicate whether they had a relation with each type. The data derived from these 
surveys will thus not refer to networking activity in terms of contact frequency, but rather to 
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networking diversity in terms of number of different types of organizations that are involved. 
However, this need not be problematic for constructing networking scales, as the Mokken 
Scaling procedure seems equally comfortable with dichotomous data (Mokken, 1971; Van 
Schuur 2003; see methodology below).  
Methodology: Mokken Scaling 
 To find different dimensions of managerial networking, we turn to cumulative scaling 
analysis to provide the answers. To be more specific, we use Mokken Scaling; a 
nonparametric “item response” model for scaling analysis. For the sake of clarity, we should 
elucidate some of the concepts and nuances central to this methodology. Then we can state 
the main advantages of its usage for the present purpose.    
 When referring to a scale, we mean ‘a set of items which are all positively correlated 
and with the property that every item coefficient or scalability (Hi) is larger than or equal to a 
given positive constant (c)’ (Mokken, 1971: 184). The items of which the scale is built up, are 
designed to be indicators of a single latent variable – i.e. some form of managerial networking 
in our case (van Schuur, 2003: 139). Each item is accordingly held to be a separate test of the 
value of the respondent on that latent trait (Torenvlied et al. 2013: 257). In this fashion, the 
Mokken model can analyze each participant’s pattern of responses. In our case, these 
participants are the SSA-coordinators from the Process-scan dataset.  
Item-Response Theory 
 “Item response theory” models - such as Mokken analysis – differ from “classic test 
theory” models - such as factor analysis – in several crucial aspects. Firstly, where IRT 
assumes that items can be included in a scale only once, CTT assumes that an item can 
contribute to several latent factors or dimensions. The participant’s scale score that Mokken 
analysis accordingly produces is then the sum of her scores on each item of the scale. Ideally, 
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we would want to see that the probability of a positive response to any given item increases 
with increasing scale values of the subjects (van Schuur, 2003: 146).  
 Moreover, where CTT makes the strong assumption that different items in the scale 
have the same mean and standard deviation, Mokken scale analysis can provide an outcome 
whenever the items are not “parallel” (Carroll 1945). The latter seems more applicable to a 
model that deals with the interactions of external organizations and actors (Torenvlied et al. 
2013: 257). After all, the main determinant for close interaction between organizations seems 
to be a physical one; actors that are closely located to the core agency are more accessible 
than distant ones. For the SSA policy, however, the functional determinant should also be 
noted. As external actors fulfill different functions in relation to the formulated policy goals, 
their resources and support will be of varying importance to the core agency. This implies a 
widely differing interaction frequency with different external actors and organization and 
makes the assumption of similar means and standard deviation undesirable.  
Cumulative Scaling  
Mokken analysis is of a cumulative nature: participants that are able to pass an item of 
some degree of difficulty, are also assumed to pass all items that are less difficult. For 
instance, whenever a student can faultlessly multiply 73 by 66, we also expect him to know 
the answer to the multiplication of 7 times 6. Note that the term ‘difficult’ should be 
interpreted in strict methodological terms. However, with regard to this assumption, errors 
should be expected at the theoretical level. Thus, it is possible that participants that pass one 
item may in practice fail to pass an item that is less difficult. To form a scale, the errors that 
arise out of this main assumption, should be randomly distributed. They are accordingly 
modeled by using a probability function that estimates how likely participants are to pass an 
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item of a given difficulty. The observed errors are then transformed into a “scale 
homogeneity” coefficient H; the inverse of the ratio between observed and expected errors.  
 When compared to other earlier developed IRT scaling techniques, Mokken scale 
analysis tries to find a way out of the shortcomings of Guttman (1950) analysis – such as a 
suboptimal criterion of model fit – by systematically representing deviations from a perfect 
Guttman scale. It does so by invoking one or more separate additional dimensions (Mokken 
1971; van Schuur, 2003: 141). Thus, similar to the Rasch Model (1960), it calculates the 
probability of a positive response to a dichotomous item by analyzing both one or more 
subject parameters and one or more item parameters. A disadvantage of using the Rasch 
Model, however, is that its assumptions are rather strict. In that sense, it is best applied to data 
with a high number of items (> 20). Again, “Mokken scaling” can provide an outcome as its 
two nested scaling models of Monotome Homogeneity and Double Monotonicity
7
 ensure that 
when a large number of different topics are treated with a relatively small number of 
indicators for each concept, potential scales can still be extracted rather well (Van Schuur, 
2003: 143). In that sense, it is ideal for our present purposes in which the SSA-coordinators 
respond to a maximum of 30 items to capture his networking behavior.  
 Summarizing, the main advantages of the Mokken data reduction technique are that it 
‘includes an item parameter that shows how items differ in their distribution, it is probabilistic 
rather than deterministic, and it can be applied in situations in which latent variables must be 
operationalized with only a small number of indicators’ (van Schuur, 2003: 141). The use of 
                                                          
7
 Monotome Homogeneity is based on the assumptions of unidimensionality, local stochastic independence, and 
monotonicity in the latent attribute, i.e. whose Item Response Functions are non-decreasingly monotone (See 
Meijer et al. 1990: 283). The model of Double Monotonicity carries the same set of assumptions, plus the 
additional assumption of monotonicity in the item difficulties (ibid: 284). 
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Mokken Scale Analysis in this paper is primarily exploratory; i.e. an experimental set of items 
is analyzed to see whether one or more scales emerge.  
Analysis: Empirical Results  
 To obtain the cumulative scales of the networking activity of the SSA-coordinator, we 
firstly scrutinized the nine performance fields of the SSA-policy (appendix A). From this we 
derived a number of potential scales by fitting the identified stakeholders (appendix B) to the 
goals (e.g. youth, direct care, psychological, etc.). The substantive argument that arose from 
this qualitative approach was accordingly cross-validated with a data-driven, exploratory 
approach facilitated by the MSP Stata module to perform the Mokken Scale Procedure 
(Hardouin 2004). The according scales that surfaced are held to represent different patterns in 
managerial networking behaviour for the SSA-context.  
` However, in order to speak of cumulative scales, several criteria have to be satisfied. 
Most importantly, each formed cumulative scale has to conform to the minimal weak scale 
criterion of H > 0.30, while each individual item loaded on the scale has to conform to Hi > 
0.30 (Molenaar et al. 2000). Considering the relatively strong relationships between the items 
in an initial analysis, we adopted a threshold value of c.(.7), starting with the two items that 
form the strongest scale (v15_2 and v15_6, i.e. Transport Companies and Home Care 
Organizations). A process of trial-and-error accordingly had us identify six separate scales 
(table 1). As mentioned, Appendix B describes the involved external actors and organizations 
more elaborately. A descriptive summary of the data is given in table 2.
8
  
 
 
                                                          
8
 Appendix C gives the raw results of the Mokken scales identified above. 
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Table 1. Mokken Scales                            . 
Networking Scales (Loevinger H) 
 Items     Loevinger H 
Carescale Transport Zorgkantoor CIZ Thuiszorg GGD 0.72 
Youthscale BJZ Schools Police   0.70 
Psyscale GGZ Welfare Org. Com. Shelters   0.90 
Supportscale Inf. Care Voluntary W. MEE   0.87 
Housingscale Reg. Gov. Hous. Comp.    0.85 
Interestscale Inf. Care Vol. Work Disabled Elderly Loc. Neighborhood 0.62 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics                           . 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Carescale 335 0 5 3.35 1.44 
Youthscale 339 0 3 1.85 1.16 
Psyscale 346 0 3 2.44 .88 
Supportscale 346 0 3 2.72 .76 
Housingscale 343 0 2 1.15 .62 
Interestscale 355 0 5 3.27 1.40 
 
Interpretation: A Qualitative Argument 
 With the items 15_2 (transport companies) and 15_6 (home care organizations) 
forming the strongest scale, we are immediately confronted with two central actors in the care 
component of the SSA-policy. Performance field 5 focuses on having clients ‘participate in 
societal traffic’ and promotes them ‘functioning independently’. Transport companies and 
home care organizations provide the services that do exactly that. While the former is used to 
ensure the mobility of clients with physical or mental impediments, the latter provides 
professional care at the homes of clients. However, besides these more direct forms of care 
provision, facilitation and coordination is also needed in order to ensure an effective and 
tailored service delivery. The Health Care Service Coordination Office (15_4), CIZ (15_5), 
27 
 
and the GGD (15_7) are types of actors fit for this role. Their tasks range from ensuring 
quality and quantity of the provided care, to checking whether clients’ claims to care 
provision are legitimate. A Loevinger H Coefficient of 0.72 for the 5 selected items seems to 
confirm the plausibility of this scale as representing a general care providers dimension in the 
SSA-Coordinator’s networking behaviour.  
 Another pillar in the SSA-policy is the support of young people and the various 
upbringing/education problems with which they are concerned (Performance field 2). 
Organizations concerned with Youth Care Provision and Youth Protection (item 15_14) are 
the first actors that come to mind in pursuit of obtaining this goal. Besides taking over the role 
of the CIZ for client under 18, they have the authority to intervene or provide assistance 
whenever a child’s upbringing is problematic for whatever reasons. To fulfil this function 
properly, however, they will have to cooperate closely with actors that can carry out important 
supportive roles. With regard to signalling functions, schools (15_15) and the police (15_16) 
can fulfil important tasks. A Loevinger H of 0.70 seems to confirm this dimension as a strong 
scale in service of youth policy. 
 Thirdly, the SSA is concerned with psychological and mental welfare (performance 
fields 6, 8, and 9). The GGD (15_9) is a particularly relevant actor in this regard as they are 
mainly focused on providing mental and psychological care, including the treatment of 
addicts. The strong scale this organizations forms with welfare organizations (v15_12) seems 
logical, considering the various activities they can provide in terms re-socialization and 
rehabilitation. Also, community shelters (v15_13) fit in well with these items. This can be 
explained by the high number of potential clients and addicts with which they deal, making a 
close collaboration - with the GGZ-organization in particular - inevitable. A signalling 
function also seems important in this regard. A Loevinger H of 0.87 supports this line of 
argument quite strongly. 
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As for the fourth scale, performance field 4 carries the promise of supporting informal 
care and voluntary work. It is thus not strange that voluntary work organizations (v15_18) and 
informal care organizations (v15_19) form a rather strong scale. Moreover, the MEE 
organization (v15_20) has an important supportive role for caretakers (voluntary work and 
informal care) that is centred on providing information and giving advice. This makes these 
three items logical partners, which is confirmed by a relatively high Loevinger H of 0.87. 
 The SSA-Policy also focuses on the ‘housing’ dimension, particularly with regard to 
those with mental and physical impediments. Obviously, housing corporations (v15_3) play 
an important role in this dimension. Municipalities usually agree with housing corporations 
that whenever new houses are built or old ones are renovated, the needs of the physically and 
mentally impeded are kept in mind. The Mokken scale analysis appoints regional government 
(v15_1) as their logical partner. Regional governments can facilitate local government policy 
by providing financial resources, legislative obligations and other types of support. 
Especially, when municipalities want to get things done in terms of housing – a policy area 
that requires rather powerful policy instruments – these regional governments can become 
useful partners. A Loevinger H of .85 supports this line of reasoning. 
Lastly, for the client-interest organizations, 5 items form a Mokken scale - H = 0.62, 
c(.6). These are ‘informal care clients’, ‘voluntary work clients’, ‘disabled clients’, ‘elderly 
clients’ and ‘local neighborhood platforms’. A possible explanation for the surfacing of this 
scale is that they may consist of the organizations that are generally well-organized. Although 
one might be thus tempted to suggest that this is proof that the more entrenched interests are 
best heard - i.e. “the haves” get more (cf. O’Toole & Meier 2004) – one should note that the 
groups identified in this scale are also the central target groups of the SSA policy. Their 
involvement in decision-making will thus be prioritized by the SSA-coordinator, as their 
information and support is crucial to the functioning of the SSA policy in general. 
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Assessing Divergent Validity 
 The divergent validity of the identified scales helps us establish that the sought 
dimensions of managerial networking actually differ from each other. To assure this we cross-
correlated the identified scales in Table 3. Several conclusions can accordingly be drawn. 
Firstly, we note that networking behaviour between the professional organizations (scales 1 
till 5) and client-interest organizations (scale 6) are rightly considered to be separate 
dimensions, demonstrated by the consistently low levels of correlation amongst them (R = 
0.07 – 0.14). As the two are stakeholder-involvement processes are largely kept separate, this 
is not a surprising observation. Secondly, although the scales derived from the professional 
organizations have a somewhat higher correlation between them, they are not of that high a 
value that it provides enough grounds for rejecting our central hypothesis of the existence of 
different dimensions in managerial networking. The empirical evidence seems consistent with 
the specified theoretical contentions: namely that the latent variable of managerial networking 
has several distinct traits. In that sense, the constructed scales seem valid and do point to 
evidence of differentiation in managerial networking of the SSA coordinator.  
Table 3. Inter-Scale Correlations                . 
Correlations  
 Carescale Youthscale Psyscale Supportscale Hscale Intscale 
Correlation Carescale 1,0000      
Youthscale   0.4779 1,0000     
Psyscale 0.5345 0.5515 1,0000    
Supportscale 0.4903 0.4494 0.6095 1,0000   
Housingscale 0.4445 0.3760 0.3586 0.3740 1,0000  
Interestscale 0.0715 0.0939 0.1365 0.1386 0.0099 1,0000 
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Conclusion and Discussion 
This paper started from the theoretical contention that a uni-dimensional 
conceptualization of networking behaviour is not compatible with the environmental 
complexity in which public managers operate. Public managers face a wide array of possible 
actions and strategic choices with regard to their potential networking behaviour and can draw 
different types of support from a wide variety of external actors and organizations. Rather 
than analyzing different levels of networking activity, this paper has then sought to expose 
different dimensions of managerial networking. This has been done through an exploratory 
use of the Mokken Scaling technique, in accordance with qualitative analyses and 
interpretation of relevant policy documents, as to add some flesh to the bones of the mere 
statistical structure. Accordingly, six different scales of managerial networking emerged in the 
SSA-context, pointing to patterns in the networking behaviour of public managers.  
 But what do these conclusions tell us with regard to the study of networking behaviour 
in general? Firstly, we have demonstrated how Mokken Scaling Analysis - rather than 
reliability analyses or factor analysis - can be used to analyze networking behaviour. This has 
allowed us to empirically deconstruct the concept of managerial networking. In that sense, it 
has become more coherent with a theoretical underpinning that emphasizes environmental 
complexity. This notion becomes particularly relevant when assessing the way in which each 
of these managerial dimensions is related to various indicators of agency performance as it 
places us in a position to specify the model of managerial networking even further. After all, 
it seems likely that each of these different dimensions will also have different effects on 
different aspects of performance. A next step would then be to link multiple dimensions of 
managerial networking to multiple dimensions of performance. Although the analytical 
delicacy of such an analysis exceeds the scope of this paper, it seems a viable research agenda 
to pursue in the future.  
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 Secondly, we should underline that the analyzed behaviour of SSA-coordinators takes 
place in a public context. It is then important to view the empirical findings presented above 
through this prism of “publicness” and to assess what insights they carry for inter-
organizational networking in the public domain in general. As the analytical section of this 
paper has demonstrated, public managers differentiate between different types of actors as to 
accommodate for the multiple goals and interests with which the implementation of the SSA-
policy is involved. This wide variety of interests and goals with which public policy is 
involved has been widely documented and seems inherent to any act of public policy making 
(Bozeman 1987; O’Toole 1997; Moore 2000; Rainey 2003). In fact, the incorporation of the 
concerns of these different stakeholders as to serve the public interest is what public 
management is all about; it provides the underpinning for democratic legitimacy. In that 
sense, the use of one general dimension of managerial networking accordingly undermines the 
inherent nature of public policy by obscuring information on the patterns to be found in 
networking behaviour. This paper has corrected for this inadequacy and has tried to 
emphasize the “publicness” of managerial networking by accounting for the environmental 
complexity in which it takes place.  
 Still, some cautions should be made. The different dimensions of managerial 
networking identified for the SSA-context seem to rely heavily on the institutional setting in 
which the analyzed behaviour takes place. In that sense, the specific goals and interests with 
which the public manager is confronted, determine the actual content of his managerial 
networking behaviour. For the SSA-context, six different dimensions surfaced, each related to 
a specific aspect of the comprehensive policy setup. However, not every public policy 
network will have to accommodate for an evenly wide variety of interest and goals. The 
patterns to be found in networking behaviour may then vary across institutional settings, as 
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the specificities of the public service provided will have an effect on the individual actions the 
network manager undertakes.  
At the theoretical level, an approach of this kind does not allow for generalization to 
other domains. Therefore, replication through similar studies in various institutional settings is 
strongly encouraged as to assess what general patterns surface across boundaries and to what 
degree the notion of context counts in the analysis of managerial networking behaviour. In 
that sense, we have to strike a balance between the general and the particular. To do so, the 
black box of what exchanges actually take place between the networking nodes needs to be 
opened. This requires extensive qualitative research. For now we have merely provided the 
structure around which such an elaborate analysis can be built. 
 Despite these shortcomings, however, the main objectives that underlie the central 
analysis of this paper seem unaffected. We set out to expose different dimensions of 
managerial networking as to facilitate the environmental complexity in which public 
managers find themselves. The analytical benefits of Mokken scaling analysis accordingly 
provided the empirical evidence compatible with this theoretical contention; public mangers 
differentiate between different external actors and organizations as they try to draw different 
types of support to the core agency. In that sense, the central thesis of different dimensions in 
managerial networking seems to hold.  
 
   
  
 
 
33 
 
Reference 
Agranoff, R. and M. McGuire. 2001. ‘Big Questions in Public Network Management 
Research’, in Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. 11 (3): 295-326. 
Agranoff, R. 2006. ‘Inside Collaborative Networks: Ten Lessons for Public Managers’, in 
Public Administration Review, Vol. 66: 56-65. 
Agranoff, R. 2007. Managing within Networks: Adding Value to Public Organizations. 
Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 
Akkerman, Agnes & René Torenvlied. 2011a. ‘Managing the Agency Environment: Effects 
of Network Ambition on Agency Performance’, in Public Management Review, Vol. 13 (1): 
159-174. 
Akkerman, Agnes & René Torenvlied. 2011b. ‘Public Management and Network Specificity’, 
in Public Management Review, Advance Access, DOI: 10.1080/14719037.2012.677213. 
Akkerman, A., R. Torenvlied & J. Schalk. 2012. ‘Two-Level Effects of Inter-Organizational 
Network Collaboration of Graduate Satisfaction: A Comparison of Five Inter-College 
Networks in Dutch Higher Education’, in American Review of Public Administration, Vol. 42 
(6): 654-677. 
Bachmann, R. & A. Zaheer. 2008. ‘Trust in Inter-organizational Relations’,  in S. Cropper, M. 
Ebers, C. Huxham & P. Smith Ring (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Inter-Organizational 
Relations (pp.xx-xx), New York: Oxford University Press.  
Bozeman, B. 1987. All Organizations are Public. San Francisco, CA: Josey-Bass. 
Carroll, J. B. 1945. ‘The effect of Difficulty and Chance Success on Correlations Between 
Items or Between Tests’, in Psychometrika, Vol. 10: 1-19. 
De Bruijn, Hans & Ernst Ten Heuvelhof. 2008. Management in Networks: On Multi-Actor 
Decision Making. New York: Taylor & Francis Ltd.  
De Klerk, M., R. Gilsing & J. Timmermans (Eds.). 2010. Op Weg met de WMO. Evaluatie 
van de Wet Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning 2007-2009. Den Haag: SCP.  
34 
 
Edelenbos, J. & E. H. Klijn. 2006. ‘Managing Stakeholder Involvement in Decision-Making: 
A Comparative Analysis of Six Interactive Processes in the Netherlands’, in Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory, Vol. 16 (3): 417-446. 
Flyvbjerg, Bent. 2001. Making Social Science Matter: Why Social Inquiry Has Failed and 
How it Can Succeed Again. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Frederickson, H. George. 1997. The Spirit of Public Administration, San Francisco, CA: 
Jossey-Bass. 
Gilsing, R. 2007. ‘Intergovernmental Relations and the Effectiveness of Local Governance: 
The Case of Dutch Youth Policy’, in International Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol. 
73: 45-64. 
Gilsing, R., M. Tuynman, J. Van der Veer & J. Iedema. 2010. ‘De Hoofdlijnen van het 
Gemeentelijk WMO-beleid’, in M. De Klerk, R. Gilsing & J. Timmermans (Eds.), Op Weg 
met de WMO. Evaluatie van de Wet Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning 2007-2009. Den Haag: 
SCP.  
Guttman, L. 1950. ‘The Basis for Scalogram Analysis’, in S. A. Stouffer et al. (Eds.), 
Measurement and Prediction. Studies in Social Psychology in World War II, Vol 4. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press.  
Hardouin, Jean-Benoit. 2004. MSP: Stata Module to Perform the Mokken Scale Procedure. 
Statistical Software Components S439402. Boston College Department of Economics, revised 
08 May 2013.  
Heymann, P. B. 1987. The Politics of Public Management. New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press. 
Hjern, B. & D. O. Porter. 1981. ‘Implementation Structures: A New Unit of Administrative 
Analysis’, in Organization Studies, Vol. 2: 211-227. 
Kickert, W. J. M., E. H. Klijn & J. F. M. Koppenjan (Eds.). 1997. Managing Complex 
Networks: Strategies for the Public Sector. London: Sage. 
Klijn, E. H. & J. F. M. Koppenjan. 1997. ‘Beleidsnetwerken als Theoretische Benadering: een 
Tussenbalans’, in Beleidswetenschap, Vol. 11 (2): 143-167. 
35 
 
Klijn, E. H. & J. F. M. Koppenjan. 2000. ‘Public Management and Policy Networks: 
Foundations of Network Approach to Governance’, in Public Management, Vol. 2 (2): 135-
158. 
Klijn, Erik-Hans & C. K. Skelcher. 2007. ‘Democracy and Network Governance: Compatible 
or Not?’, in Public Administration, Vol. 85 (3): 587-608. 
Koppenjan, J., M. Kars & H. van der Voort. 2009. ‘Vertical Politics in Horizontal Policy 
Networks: Framework Setting as Coupling Arrangement’, in The Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 
37 (4): 769-792. 
Laumann, Edward O. & David Knoke. 1987. The Organizational State, Madison: University 
of Wisconsin Press. 
Lawrence, P. R. & J. W. Lorsch. 1967. Organization and Environment: Managing 
Differentiation and Integration. Boston, MA: Harvard University.  
Lynn, Laurence E. Jr. 2006. Public Management: Old and New. London: Taylor & Francis 
Ltd. 
McEvely, B., V, Perrone and A. Zaheer. 2003. ‘Trust as an Organizing Principle’, in 
Organization Science, Vol. 14: 91-103. 
McGuire, M. 2002. ‘Managing Networks: Propositions on What Managers Do and Why They 
Do It’, in Public Administration Review, Vol. 62: 599-609. 
Meier, Kenneth J. & Laurence J. O’Toole Jr. 2003. ‘Public Management and Educational 
Performance: The Impact of Managerial Networking’, in Public Administration Review, Vol. 
63: 689-699. 
Meijer, Rob R., Klaas Sijtsma & Nico G. Smid. 1990. ‘Theoretical and Empirical Comparison 
of the Mokken and the Rasch Approach to IRT’, in Applied Psychological Measurement, Vol. 
14 (3): 283-298; 
Milward, H. Brinton & Keith G. Provan. 2000. ‘Governing the Hollow State’, in Journal of 
Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol. 10 (2): 359-379. 
Mokken, R. J. 1971. A Theory and Procedure of Scale Analysis. With Applications in 
Political Research. The Hague, the Netherlands: Mouton. 
36 
 
Molenaar, I. W., R. J. Mokken, W. H. Van Schuur & K. Sijtsma. 2000. MSP Version 5. 
Groningen, Netherlands: Handguide.  
Moore, M. H. 1995. Creating Public Value: Strategic Management in Government. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Moore, M. H. 2000. ‘Managing for Value: Organizational Strategy in For-Profit, Nonprofit, 
and Governmental Organizations’, in Non Profit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, Vol. 29: 
183-204.  
Moynihan, D. P. & S. K. Pandey. 2005. ‘Testing How Management Matters in an Era of 
Government by Performance Management’, in Journal of Public Administration Research 
and Theory, Vol. 15: 421-439.  
O’Toole, Jr. Laurence J. 1997. ‘Treating Networks Seriously: Practical and Research Based 
Agendas in Public Administration’, in Public Administration Review, Vol. 57: 45-52. 
O’Toole, Jr. Lawrence J. & Meier, Kenneth J. 1999. ‘Modeling the Impact of Public 
Management: Implications of Structural Context’, in Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Theory, Vol. 9 (4): 505-526. 
O’Toole, Jr. Lawrence J. & Meier, Kenneth J. 2004. ‘Desperately Seeking Selznick: 
Cooptation and the Dark Side of Public Management in Networks’, in Public Administration 
Review, Vol. 64 (6): 681-693; 
O’Toole, Jr. Lawrence J. & Meier, Kenneth J. 2011. Public Management: Organizations, 
Governance, and Performance. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
O’Toole, Jr. Lawrence J. 2012. ‘Interorganizational Relations and Policy Implementation’, in 
B. G. Peters & J. Pierre (Eds.), The Handbook of Public Administration. Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage Publications.  
Pfeffer, J. & G. R. Salancik. 1978. The External Control of Organizations: a Resource 
Dependence Perspective. New York, NY: Harper and Row.  
Powell, W., K. Koput & L. Smith-Doerr. 1996. ‘Inter-organizational Collaboration and the 
Locus of Innovation: Networks of Learning in Biotechnology’, in Administrative Science 
Quarterly, Vol. 41: 116-145. 
37 
 
Provan, K. G. & Milward, H. B. 1995. ‘A Preliminary Theory of Network Effectiveness: A 
Comparative Study of Four Mental Health Systems’, in Administrative Science Quarterly, 
Vol. 40: 1-33. 
Provan, K. G. and P. Kenis. 2008. ‘Modes of Network Governance: Structure, Management 
and Effectiveness’, in Journal of Public Administrative Research and Theory. Vol. X (XX): 
229-252. 
Rainey, H. G. & Steinbauer, P. 1999. ‘Galloping Elephants: Developing Elements of a Theory 
of Effective Government Organizations’, in Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory, Vol. 9: 1-33. 
Rainey, Hal. G. 2003. Understanding & Managing Public Organizations. San Francisco, CA: 
Jossey-Bass. 
Rasch, G. 1960. Probabilistic Models for Some Intelligence and Attainment Tests. 
Copenhagen: Nielsen and Lydiche. 
Rethemeyer, Karl R. & Deneen M. Hatmaker. 2008. ‘Network Management Reconsidered: 
An Inquiry into Management of Network Structures in Public Sector Service Provision’, in 
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol. 18 (4): 617-646.  
Rittel, Horst W. J. & Melvin Webber. 1973. ‘Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning’, in 
Policy Sciences, Vol. 4 (2): 155-169.  
Sartori, G. 1970. ‘Concept Misformation in Comparitive Politics’, in The American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 64 (4): 1033-1053. 
Schalk, Jelmer, René Torenvlied and Jim Allen. 2010. ‘Network Embeddedness and Public 
Agency Performance: the strength of Strong Ties in Dutch Higher Education’, in Journal of 
Public Administrative Research and Theory, Vol. 20 (3): 629-653. 
Schalk, Jelmer. 2011. ‘Linking Stakeholder Involvement to Policy Performance: Nonlinear 
and Stakeholder-Specific Effects in Dutch Local Government Policy Making’, Paper 
Presented at the 2011 Public Management Research Conference, Maxwell School at 
Syracuse University, NY, USA, June 2-4.  
38 
 
Schalk, Jelmer. 2013. ‘Interorganisational Relations and Goal Consensus: An Exploratory 
Study in Two Local Dutch Service Delivery Networks’, in Local Government Studies, Vol. 39 
(6): 853-877. 
Timmermans, J., R. Gilsing & M. De Klerk. 2010. ‘Het Evaluatieonderzoek naar de Wet 
Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning’, in M. De Klerk, R. Gilsing & J. Timmermans (Eds.), Op 
Weg met de WMO. Evaluatie van de Wet Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning 2007-2009. Den 
Haag: SCP.  
Toonen, Theo A. J. 1998. ‘Networks, Management, and Institutions: Public Administration as 
‘Normal’ Science’, in Public Administration, Vol. 76: 229-252. 
Torenvlied, René, Agnes Akkerman, Kenneth J. Meier & Laurence J. O’Toole Jr. 2013. ‘The 
Multiple Dimensions of Managerial Networking’, in American Review of Public 
Administration, Vol. 43 (3): 251-272. 
Tweede Kamer. 2003-2004. Zorg en Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning. 29 538, nr. 1. 
Tweede Kamer. 2004-2005. Nieuwe Regels Betreffende Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning 
(Wet Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning); Voorstel van Wet en Memorie van Toelichting, 30, 
131, nr. 2-3. 
Van der Veer, Judith, Jelmer Schalk & Rob Gilsing. 2011. ‘Decentralisatie: Maatwerk of 
Uniformiteit? Het WMO-beleid van Nederlandse Gemeenten’, in Beleid en Maatschappij, 
Vol. 38 (3): 265-282. 
Van Schuur, W. H. 2003. ‘Mokken Scale Analysis: Between the Guttman Scale and 
Parametric Item Response Theory’, in Political Analysis, Vol. 11: 139-163.  
Veldheer, V. 2009. ‘Evaluatieonderzoek naar Gedecentraliseerd Sociaal en Cultureel Beleid’, 
in S. Keuzenkamp (Ed.), Decentralisatie en de Bestuurskracht van de Gemeente. SCP-
Symposium 25 augustus 2009, Den Haag: SCP. 
Zaheer, A., B. McEvely & V. Perrone. 1998. ‘Does Trust Matter? Exploring the Effects of 
Interorganizational and Interpersonal Trust on Performance’, in Organization Science, Vol. 9: 
141-159. 
 
39 
 
Appendices 
Appendix A 
The 9 “Performance-Fields” of the SSA (TK 2004-2005)   
1. Improve the livability and social cohesion in villages, neighborhoods, and districts.  
2. A focus on prevention in supporting youth that has troubles growing up and parents 
that have difficulty raising them.  
3. Providing information, advice, and client support.  
4. Supporting informal care and voluntary work.  
5. Promote that people with a physical or mental impediment or people with a psycho-
social disorder participate in societal traffic and can function independently.  
6. Facilitate people with (mental/physical) impediments or permanent mental disorders 
and people with psycho-social problems to function independently and maintain 
their participation in societal traffic.  
7. Providing community shelter, also for woman.  
8. Promote public mental health care, excluding psycho-social help in case of 
disasters.  
9. Promote addiction-policy.  
Appendix B 
Stakeholders and Organizations 
- Regional Governments v15_1_dich: Regional governments – together with the ‘big four’ 
cities – fulfil a supporting role in local level policy (Timmermans et al. 2010: 35). Their 
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support is expected to contribute to an adequate execution of the SSA. Municipalities can 
cooperate with each other in formulating and implementing the SSA policy. Regional 
governments can facilitate this process by providing financial resources, legislative 
obligations and other types of support. This provides the municipalities with an extra set of 
policy instruments for attaining the goals set out by the SSA. 
- Transport Companies v15_2_dich: Various transport companies are used to ensure the 
mobility of clients with physical or mental impediments. These transport companies have to 
be adjusted to their specific needs. The biggest share of this work is outsourced to the best 
bidder.  
- Housing Corporations v15_3_dich: Municipalities usually agree with housing corporations 
that whenever new houses are built or old ones are renovated, the needs of the physically and 
mentally impeded are kept in mind. These organizations thus have a central role in 
implementing the ‘living’ element of the SSA policy.  
- Health Care Service Coordination Office (Zorgkantoor) v15_4_dich: This organization 
makes sure that everyone gets the amount and type of care to which he/she is entitled. This 
also means ensuring both quantity (enough supply) and quality of the delivered care. To the 
clients it can act as an information provider, a moderator, or an administrative office.   
- CIZ, SSA Client Eligibility Indication Office v15_5_dich: The CIZ assures and controls 
whether clients’ claims to SSA care are legitimate. The indication that the CIZ gives, informs 
the clients about what type and amount of care they are entitled to.   
- Home Care Organizations v15_6_dich: Professional care provider (at the homes of clients); 
i.e. a pillar organization of SSA implementation.  
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- GGD v15_7_dich: Agency that falls under municipal responsibility. Has the legislative task 
to improve and protect the health of citizens against illness and calamities. At the operational 
level, this means a wide variety of tasks and projects, ranging from providing vaccinations 
and doing research, to employing school doctors and performing anonymous STD-tests. For 
the SSA, the GGD has an important monitoring and supporting function. 
- Residential Care Homes v15_8_dich: If clients can no longer take care of themselves, the 
CIZ will refer them to residential care homes.  
- GGZ v15_9_dich: Provides mental/psychological health care (+ addiction). Clients with 
mental disorders will thus fall under their target-group. The GGZ can then play an important 
role in SSA implementation. 
- Organizations for Disabled Clients v15_10_dich: Organizations that provide a protected 
living environment to clients who are physically or mentally handicapped.  
- Financial Aid Organizations (excluding banks) v15_11_dich: Clients that run into financial 
troubles can apply for financial aid at various financial institutions closely connected to the 
SSA-implementation (self-reliance).   
- Welfare Organizations v15_12_dich: Organization that undertakes various social activities 
and services aimed at citizen participation at the local level.  
- Community Shelters v15_13_dich: Provides temporary shelter for the homeless. Important 
pillar for the SSA because the policy aims to shift the strategy of shelter provision towards 
prevention, etc. 
- BJZ, youth health care coordination office v15_14_dich: Takes over the role of the CIZ for 
clients under 18. Moreover, this organization has the authority to intervene/provide assistance 
whenever a child’s upbringing is problematic for whatever reasons.  
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- Schools v15_15_dich: Their part in the SSA-policy can probably be found in the handling of 
special schools. Moreover, they have an important signalling function. 
- Police Departments v15_16_dich: Provides assistance in dealing with problematic families. 
They also have an important signalling function.  
- Religious Organizations v15_17_dich: Has an important function in enhancing participation 
of the elderly in particular. Moreover, churches and such can fulfil a signalling function.   
- Informal Care Organizations v15_18_dich: speaks for itself.  
- Voluntary work Organizations v15_19_dich: speaks for itself. 
- MEE, administrative aid office v15_20_dich: National organization with regional 
departments that supports clients by providing information, building their personal networks, 
and eventually enhancing participation. 
* Client-interest organizations (11): v19_1 – v19_11 
 Eleven client-interest organizations are included in the sample: Informal care clients, 
Voluntary Work Clients, Disabled Clients, Social Security Clients, Elderly Clients, Patients 
associations, Local Neighborhood Platforms, Homeless, Migrant associations, Individual 
Citizens, and Youth Associations. As the functions of these organizations speak for 
themselves no further elaboration is needed besides summation.   
Appendix C 
Raw Results Mokken Scale Analyses 
1. Care Scale: GGD, CIZ, Health Care Service Coordination Office, Transport 
Companies, Home Care Organizations. 
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2. Youth Scale: Schools, BJZ, Police Departments. 
 
3. Psychology Scale: Community Shelters, GGZ, Welfare Organizations. 
 
4. Support Scale: Informal Care Organizations, Voluntary Work Organizations, MEE. 
 
5. Housing Scale: Regional Governments, Housing Cooperations. 
 
6. Interest Scale: Informal Care Clients, Voluntary Work Clients, Disabled Clients, 
Elderly Clients, Homeless. 
Scale         335                       79      283.36      0.72121     20.8061     0.00000
                                                                                                   
v15_6_dich    335       0.8925          22       88.55      0.75155     13.4212     0.00000      0
v15_2_dich    335       0.2806          21       87.27      0.75936      9.9270     0.00000      0
v15_4_dich    335       0.6060          38      145.51      0.73885     15.2427     0.00000      0
v15_5_dich    335       0.7045          43      144.13      0.70165     14.9900     0.00000      0
v15_7_dich    335       0.8687          34      101.28      0.66429     12.5913     0.00000      0
                                                                                                   
Item          Obs        Score      errors      errors      H coeff     z-stat.     p-value    Hjk
                          Mean     Guttman     Guttman    Loevinger               H0: Hj<=0  of NS
                                  Observed    Expected                                      Number
Scale         339                       49      160.36      0.69444     15.4640     0.00000
                                                                                                   
v15_16_dich   339       0.4867          33      106.11      0.68899     12.1159     0.00000      0
v15_14_dich   339       0.7404          28       97.09      0.71159     12.2557     0.00000      0
v15_15_dich   339       0.6165          37      117.53      0.68518     13.5094     0.00000      0
                                                                                                   
Item          Obs        Score      errors      errors      H coeff     z-stat.     p-value    Hjk
                          Mean     Guttman     Guttman    Loevinger               H0: Hj<=0  of NS
                                  Observed    Expected                                      Number
Scale         346                        7       69.29      0.89898     14.7953     0.00000
                                                                                                   
v15_12_dich   346       0.9451           0       28.39      1.00000     11.0561     0.00000      0
v15_9_dich    346       0.8237           7       56.55      0.87622     13.3643     0.00000      0
v15_13_dich   346       0.6705           7       53.64      0.86950     11.9985     0.00000      0
                                                                                                   
Item          Obs        Score      errors      errors      H coeff     z-stat.     p-value    Hjk
                          Mean     Guttman     Guttman    Loevinger               H0: Hj<=0  of NS
                                  Observed    Expected                                      Number
Scale         346                        8       63.47      0.87396     21.0412     0.00000
                                                                                                   
v15_18_dich   346       0.9335           3       41.08      0.92697     18.8774     0.00000      0
v15_19_dich   346       0.9249           6       43.66      0.86259     18.0011     0.00000      0
v15_20_dich   346       0.8613           7       42.20      0.83413     15.0731     0.00000      0
                                                                                                   
Item          Obs        Score      errors      errors      H coeff     z-stat.     p-value    Hjk
                          Mean     Guttman     Guttman    Loevinger               H0: Hj<=0  of NS
                                  Observed    Expected                                      Number
Scale         343                        2       13.14      0.84783      3.9026     0.00005
                                                                                                   
v15_3_dich    343       0.8659           2       13.14      0.84783      3.9026     0.00005      0
v15_1_dich    343       0.2857           2       13.14      0.84783      3.9026     0.00005      0
                                                                                                   
Item          Obs        Score      errors      errors      H coeff     z-stat.     p-value    Hjk
                          Mean     Guttman     Guttman    Loevinger               H0: Hj<=0  of NS
                                  Observed    Expected                                      Number
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Scale         355                      118      314.52      0.62483     19.3489     0.00000
                                                                                                   
v19_8         355       0.2310          26       78.54      0.66894      7.9950     0.00000      0
v19_5         355       0.8873          31       95.44      0.67518     12.3855     0.00000      0
v19_3         355       0.8451          46      118.55      0.61198     12.4417     0.00000      0
v19_2         355       0.6479          66      168.17      0.60754     14.2574     0.00000      0
v19_1         355       0.6620          67      168.35      0.60202     14.2316     0.00000      0
                                                                                                   
Item          Obs        Score      errors      errors      H coeff     z-stat.     p-value    Hjk
                          Mean     Guttman     Guttman    Loevinger               H0: Hj<=0  of NS
                                  Observed    Expected                                      Number
